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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal arises from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this Appeal, pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The present proceeding before this Court involves an initial 
Appeal by Appellants Christensen & Kimball, a Utah general 
partnership, and Victor M. Kimball, individually and as general 
partner of said partnership. In that Appeal, the Appellants seek 
review of the Trial Court's finding and judgment relative to 
alleged misrepresentations by Appellants as to the size of the lot 
purchased by the Plaintiffs. With regard to sugh Appeal, the 
following issues are raised: 
1. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the Trial Court could find that a negligent misrepresentation 
had occurred. 
2. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the Trial Court could find that the Plaintiffs relied upon 
any such misrepresentations. 
3. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the Trial Court could find that the reliance, if any, of the 
Plaintiffs was reasonable. 
4. Whether or not the finding of the Trial Court with 
respect to damages relative to such negligence misrepresentation 
were consistent with and supported by the evidence. 
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In response to the original Appeal, the Plaintiffs filed a 
Cross-Appeal seeking a review of the findings of the Trial Court 
with respect to the issue of the implied warranty of habitability. 
An additional Cross-Appeal was also filed by Defendant Spectrum 
Development, also regarding the issue of the implied warranty of 
habitability. Those issues will not be addressed by these 
Appellants in this Brief, but will be left to be addressed by the 
remaining parties and in the Reply Brief of these Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This matter involves various disputes arising from the 
purchase of a new home by the Plaintiffs. The home was constructed 
by the Defendant Burningham & Kimball, a Utah general partnership. 
The lot upon which the home is located was originally owned by the 
Appellant, Christensen & Kimball, a Utah general partnership, with 
Victor M. Kimball as the general partner. 
Almost immediately upon the purchase of the home, the 
Plaintiffs claim that they experienced numerous difficulties 
relative to the construction of the home, including such things as 
inadequate heating and air conditioning systems, frozen pipes and 
water in the basement. For these problems, the Plaintiffs claimed 
various breaches of express and implied warranties, including the 
warranty of habitability. 
In addition, the Plaintiffs allege that they discovered that 
the lot upon which the home was located was significantly smaller 
than had been represented to them by both the sales literature 
prepared by the seller, as well as the representations of the 
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Defendant Victor Kimball. For this problem, the Plaintiffs claimed 
damages as the result of negligent misrepresentation. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT. 
The case was tried to the Court over a period of several days. 
Because of the Trial Court's schedule, there were often large 
delays or interruptions between trial days. The decision of the 
Trial Court was issued on July 31, 1992. The Trial Court granted 
judgment to the Plaintiffs and against the Defendants on the issue 
of the negligent misrepresentation with respect to the lot size. 
The Trial Court also found that an implied warranty of habitability 
exists in the State of Utah and was applicable to the facts of this 
case, that various items in the home had not been constructed in a 
workmanlike manner but that such defects did not breach the 
warranty of habitability. Specifically, the Trial Court found that 
the defects and problems experienced by the Plaintiffs did not make 
the home uninhabitable, as that term is defined in the law. 
In accordance with the ruling of the Court, on January 14, 
1993, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered and a 
Judgment rendered in the sum of $21,769.90 in favor of Plaintiffs. 
As indicated, the money judgment related solely to the issue of the 
negligent misrepresentation with respect to the lot size. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
As indicated above, the original Appeal raised only issues 
relative to the negligent misrepresentation as to the size of the 
lot. Accordingly, the following is a statement of only those facts 
which relate to the misrepresentation claim, and not to the breach 
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of warranty claims. All references shall be to the numbered pages 
of the record, inasmuch as the Transcript has been numbered 
serially as a part of the record. 
1. Plaintiffs are husband and wife. Their prior 
experience in the purchase of real estate involved purchases of 
prior residences. (R. 1697-98.) 
2. The home in question is located at 2364 Scenic Drive 
in Salt Lake City. The home faces essentially eastward toward the 
street with the backyard extending in a westerly direction. The 
property is situated in the foothills and slopes downward in a 
westerly direction. It overlooks a large office building known as 
the "GMAC" Building, which is located on Foothill Drive. 
3. Plaintiffs first noticed the home by observing a 
large "For Sale" sign on the balcony of the home. (R. 1698.) 
4. At their first inspection, Plaintiffs inspected the 
outside of the home but were unable to gain entrance to the home 
because the same was locked. There was a lock box on the home by 
which realtors could gain access to the home. (R. 1701.) 
5. Plaintiffs were working with a licensed realtor, 
Richard Strong, the father of the Plaintiff, Vicki Forsberg. 
Plaintiffs enlisted Mr. Strong's assistance in gaining access to 
the home through the lock box. (R. 1701.) 
6. When the Plaintiffs first gained access to the home, 
it was in the company of their realtor, Mr. Strong. Upon their 
first visit, they obtained a "fact sheet", which had been prepared 
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and left in the home for use by prospective buyers. (R. 1702; 
Exhibit P-27.) 
7. The fact sheet was originally prepared by a realtor 
hired by the Defendant, Victor Kimball. Mr. Kimball had no hand in 
the preparation of the document. (R. 1161.) 
8. Throughout the process of purchasing the home in 
question, the Plaintiffs were assisted and advised by their 
realtor, Mr. Strong. (R. 1787.) 
9. At the time of the initial inspection of the home by 
the Plaintiffs, there were no stakes or other markers to show the 
boundaries of the lot. (R. 1713.) 
10. Because the backyard of the home looked downward 
upon the roof of the GMAC Building, previous real estate agents 
hired by the Defendant Kimball had suggested planting trees to 
obscure the view of the that building. Accordingly, a row of trees 
was planted on the west side of the home, between the home and the 
GMAC Building, but without reference to the actual boundaries of 
the lot which the Plaintiffs purchased. (R. 2101-02.) 
11. As it regards the size of the lot in question, the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants had only one conversation; that 
conversation occurred on the second visit of the Plaintiffs to the 
home. Present at this visit were the Plaintiffs, their real estate 
agent Mr. Strong, and the Defendant Victor Kimball. (R. 1713.) 
The Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg recalls the conversation, (R. 1714), 
but the Plaintiff Vicki Forsberg does not. (R. 1336.) 
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12. Plaintiffs purchased the home on or about November 
17, 1987. (Exhibit P-28.) 
13. Subsequent to the purchase of the home, Plaintiff 
had the backyard boundary line surveyed and learned that the actual 
boundary line was nearer to the home than the row of trees. (R. 
1720.) 
14. Prior to the filing of this litigation, the 
Plaintiffs removed the row of trees, (R. 1798), and extended the 
yard beyond the row of trees and beyond the actual boundary line. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The specific findings of the Trial Court with respect to the 
claim of negligent misrepresentation are Findings 24 through 27, 
inclusive. (R. 696-97.) It is the position of these Appellants 
that there is insufficient evidence upon which the Trial Court 
could make these findings and that they are, therefore, in error. 
Specifically, the Trial Court found that the combination of 
the fact sheet, (Exhibit P-27), and the planting of poplar trees as 
a "sight barrier" between the subject home and the GMAC Building 
constituted a misrepresentation as to the size of the lot. 
However, the Plaintiffs freely admit that in the single 
conversation with Defendant Kimball on the issue of the size of the 
backyard, it was made clear that no one knew the exact boundaries 
of the backyard and that the trees did not represent the boundary 
line of the lot. The record is, further, clear that the dimensions 
on the fact sheet "98' x 102'" referred to the lot size itself and 
that the actual dimensions of the lot are 98f x 102'. 
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The record shows that the Plaintiffs were well aware that the 
exact dimensions of the lot were not known and that they could, if 
they chose to do so, have required a survey of the property. The 
Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by a realtor who was 
familiar with the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement for 
calling for a survey if desired. The Plaintiffs testified, over 
and over again, that the size of the yard was critical to them; and 
yet they did nothing whatsoever to learn the size of the lot. 
Accordingly, their reliance upon any representations of the 
Defendants were unreasonable and unjustified. 
Finally, in Finding 27, (R. 696), the Trial Court made a 
specific finding that the actual property would have contained 
9,996 square feet. The Trial Court further found that the actual 
size of the lot was 4,628 square feet. There is absolutely no 
evidence in the record to support these conclusions. As will be 
shown, the Plaintiffs admitted that they thought the western 
boundary of the lot to run within a few feet of the line of trees. 
The testimony of the Plaintiffs is that the trees were within 45 
feet of the home. The Trial Court, accordingly, made findings 
which extend beyond the evidence. 
The result was that the Trial Court granted damages for the 
lost square footage which is wholly unsupported and constitutes 
nothing more than a guess as to the difference between the square 
footage represented and the square footage granted. Since the 
calculation of damages is beyond any evidence in the record, it 
cannot be allowed to stand. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT A MISREPRESENTATION HAD OCCURRED. 
In this case these Appellants claim that no misrepresentation 
occurred as to the boundaries of the lot being purchased and that 
the Trial Court's finding in that regard was in error. In so 
claiming, Appellants are aware of the applicable law and standard 
of review. In Harline v. Campbell, 728 P.2d 980 (Utah, 1986) the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Under familiar rules of appellate review, the Court views 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment 
of the trial court, and the findings of the trial court 
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial 
record evidence to support them. Id. at 98 2. 
Appellants are also aware that the burden is placed upon them 
to demonstrate to this Court the error of the Trial Court. In Reed 
v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1991) the Supreme Court stated: 
In order to challenge the court's findings of fact, the 
defendant must marshall all of the evidence in favor of 
the findings and then demonstrate that even when 
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. 
Appellants, therefore, have included in this Brief all 
references to the issue of lot size so as to demonstrate that the 
evidence is wholly lacking to support a finding of negligent 
misrepresentation. The evidence in the record relating to the 
issue of lot size is limited to the testimony of two witnesses, 
Farrell Forsberg, the Plaintiff, and Victor Kimball, the Defendant. 
No other witnesses testified that they had any discussions with or 
knowledge of the issue of the size of the lot. In addition, there 
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are only two exhibits upon which the Plaintiffs rely relative to 
the issue of lot size, Exhibits P-27 and P-35. Copies of both 
Exhibits are attached hereto as Appendices 1 and 2. 
The testimony of Farrell Forsberg is that he received a copy 
of Exhibit P-27, the fact sheet, on his second visit to the home. 
(R. 1702.) At the time of that visit, he was in the company of his 
wife and his realtor, Mr. Strong. (R. 1701.) The fact sheet 
refers to the size of the lot with the following language: 
Yard Size: 98 • x 102 • , flat backyard with room for a 
pool. (Appendix 1.) 
There is no testimony from any party to the effect that the 
language used on the fact sheet was discussed or that the parties 
came to any understanding as to what was meant by the words used on 
the fact sheet. 
Mr. Forsberg testified, in response to questioning by his 
counsel, that the size of the yard was an important consideration. 
In fact, Mr. Forsberg testified, on numerous occasions, as follows: 
It was a very critical feature. We wanted a home that we 
could live in comfortably inside, but it was very 
important to us that children, little children, could 
enjoy . . . . (R. 1709, L. 18-21.) 
At no time did Mr. Forsberg testify that he told any Defendant 
that the lot or yard size was a "critical feature". When asked 
about the discussion with Mr. Kimball about the size of the lot, 
Mr. Forsberg testified that they talked about the size of the lot 
but did not testify that the fact sheet was discussed. (R. 1713-
14.) Mr. Forsberg further stated, on questioning from his counsel, 
that the discussion was as follows: 
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Question: And did you have occasion to talk with Vic 
Kimball about the size of the yard on that 
first visit? 
Answer: Yes, we did. 
Question: And would you tell me what Mr- Kimball said 
and what you said as best you can, about the 
size of the lot? 
Answer: The exact wording at this time I can't recall, 
but I do remember a very critical issue was 
the size of the backyard. (R. 1713, L. 24-
25; R. 1714, L. 1-2; 14-20.) 
Mr. Forsberg also testified about the significance of the line 
of poplar trees which had been planted at the back of the lot to 
obscure the view of the top of the GMAC Building. Again, on direct 
examination, Mr. Forsberg stated: 
Question: Did you have some discussion with Mr. Kimball 
about those poplar trees? 
Answer: Yes, I did. 
Question: Tell us what you said and what he said, as best you 
can. 
Answer: Well, I was trying to confirm the boundaries of the 
backyard, and I asked him about the poplar trees. 
And he related to me that the poplar trees were a 
reflection of the backyard, roughly the back west 
boundary of the yard. 
Answer: He described that the poplar trees - because there 
were no landscape markers there, I was concerned 
as to exactly where the back corners and back 
property line were, and he assured me that the 
poplar trees were within the property of the 
residence for sale. 
Question: Within the property? 
Answer: Correct. 
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Question: But not at the exact boundary line? 
Answer: No. (R. 1718, L. 2-23.) 
The only other testimony Mr. Forsberg gave on this issue was 
in response to cross examination. At that time, Mr. Forsberg 
testified as to the following points: 
1. Although the size of the lot was critical, he did not 
discuss that with his realtor, Mr. Strong: 
Question: Ok. At that time did you have a discussion with Mr. 
Strong that the backyard of this home was 
supposed to be 98' x 102'? 
Answer: I don't recall that being specifically addressed. 
(R. 1790, Line 6-10.) 
2. The exact measurements of the yard were not 
important. All that was important was that the yard be "spacious", 
a fact which was never discussed with Defendants: 
Answer: I assume so. I don't recall focusing on those 
specific numbers. But again, my impression was 
that this was a spacious yard. 
Question: You have used in your testimony - well, strike 
that. You said you assumed it was spacious yard. 
Is that what it says to you? 
Answer: This would. — (R. 1791, L. 2-8.) 
3. Mr. Forsberg admitted that he had no specific 
definition or dimension which constituted "spacious" but that at 
least 40 feet of backyard was necessary: 
Question: 40? 
Answer: Probably. As you begin getting into that range. 
That is beginning to get into the range of what we 
perceived to be a spacious backyard. 
Question: So at least 40 feet would be necessary for it to be 
spacious? 
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Answer: In that neighborhood, yes. (R. 1792, L. 5-13.) 
4. Although the size of the yard was critical, Mr. 
Forsberg did not request or cause a survey of the property to be 
done and did not speak with Mr. Dick Strong about the possibility 
of a survey. (R. 1796-97.) 
5. Mr. Forsberg admitted that the distance from the back 
door of the home to the farthest poplar tree was approximately 45 
feet. This distance is marked on Exhibit P-35. (R. 164, L. 13-15; 
Appendix 2.) 
6. Mr. Forsberg testified that he had no idea exactly 
what was a big enough yard and that it was just a "feeling". (R. 
1803A.) 
7. Mr. Forsberg admitted that Mr. Kimball had indicated 
that he did not know where the boundary lines of the property were: 
Question: Now, did the word "roughly" to you indicate that 
Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know? 
Answer: He did not know what the exact property line was. 
(R. 1807, L. 17-20.) 
Question: And therefore, based upon the fact that you knew 
Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know either, did you ask 
for a survey of the property? 
Answer: We did not. (R. 1808, L. 5-8.) 
8. Mr. Forsberg testified that he made an assumption 
that the backyard of the home was somewhere near 98 feet deep, but 
that he did not address that issue with the Defendants: 
Question: Therefore, you would have to agree with me, 
wouldn't you, that you assumed that the backyard of 
this home went somewhere near 98 feet; correct? 
12 
Answer: I must have made that assumption. That was not 
specifically addressed with the Kimballs. (R. 
1810, L. 12-16.) 
9. Mr. Forsberg did admit that he did not believe the 
yard went down to the GMAC Building on the west but that the 
boundary line, in order to go out 98 feet, would have to extend 
beyond the poplar trees by at least another 45 feet. (R. 1811.) 
10. Mr. Forsberg testified that Mr. Kimball gave him the 
impression that the property line was within a couple of feet of 
the poplar trees: 
Question: Do you recall telling me in the deposition that the 
boundary was probably a couple of feet behind or to 
the west of where the poplar trees were planted? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Is that still your testimony today? 
Answer: A couple of feet, several feet. Whether that's two 
or three or five, he told me that th% property line 
was beyond the trees. 
Question: A couple of feet; right? 
Answer: Yes. 
The testimony of Mr. Kimball on the issue of the size of the 
lot is not inconsistent with the testimony given by Mr. Forsberg. 
Mr. Kimball testified that, at the time of his meeting with Mr. 
Forsberg, he did not know where the back corners of the lot were. 
(R. 1161.) Mr. Kimball also testified that, in response to a 
question from Mr. Forsberg about where the back property was, he 
stated: "I said 'No, I do not know where the property line is.'" 
(R. 762, L. 17-19.) 
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Regarding the issue of the trees, in relation to the back 
property line, Mr. Kimball made the following points: 
1. The trees were planted as far back as possible, 
without regard to the boundary line of the property: 
Question: What else did you say regarding that issue? 
Anything else? 
Answer: Well, I told him that the trees were planted on the 
back of the property, as far back as we could 
possibly go, no knowing exactly where the trees 
were in relation to the back lot line. 
Question: Did you have the trees planted? 
Answer: I - I called the landscaper and asked him to plant 
them. 
Question: Did you tell the landscaper to plant the trees on 
your lot or off your lot? 
Answer: I just told him to plant them as far back as they 
could. 
Question: Do you know whether or not they planted them on the 
lot or off the lot? 
Answer: I do not, no. 
Question: Did you intend, by putting those trees back there, 
to indicate where the back lot line was? 
Answer: No, I did not. 
Question: Did you ever tell Mr. Forsberg that the trees were 
within the boundary lines of the lot? 
Answer: No, I did not. 
Question: Why didn't you tell him that? 
Answer: I did not know where the back property line was. 
(R. 1162-63.) 
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Regarding whether or not the backyard was intended to be 
represented as extending 98 feet from the foundation of the home, 
Mr. Kimball stated: 
Question: Did you ever discuss with Mr. Forsberg the fact 
that the backyard extended 98 feet or 102 feet 
beyond where you were standing when you were 
looking at it? 
Answer: I did not. 
Question: Approximately how close to the General Motors 
Building would that 98 or 102 feet have been? 
Answer: Well, I think it would have been in the parking lot 
of General Motors. 
Question: And approximately how far beyond the trees would 
that have gone? 
Answer: Probably the whole lot size again further. (R. 
1164, L. 9-22.) 
The foregoing is a complete recitation of the testimony and 
documentary evidence regarding the size of the- lot and the 
Plaintiffs1 claim of misrepresentation. From such evidence one can 
determine that a single conversation occurred between Plaintiffs 
and Defendant regarding the size of the lot. In that conversation, 
both parties admitted knowing that neither party knew where the 
boundary lines of the lot were. Both parties admitted that there 
were no markers to delineate the boundary line. Mr. Forsberg 
stated that he wanted a "spacious11 yard but admitted he did not 
define what he meant by spacious and did not indicate his 
definition to Mr. Kimball. 
Mr. Forsberg never testified that he thought the backyard of 
his home extended to the GMAC Building. Rather, he testified that 
he did not believe that it extended to the GMAC Building. Yet, as 
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testified by Mr. Kimball, 98 feet would put the backyard of Mr. 
Forsberg home in the middle of the GMAC property. 
Interwoven through this evidence is the undisputed fact that 
the exact dimensions of the lot were known and/or readily 
ascertainable by the Plaintiffs. Exhibit P-l shows that the 
dimensions of the lot were 122.40 feet across the front, 102.38 
feet down the south boundary, 77.85 feet across the western side 
and 98.23 feet along the northern boundary. Accordingly, the fact 
sheet showing the dimensions to be 98' x 102' was not incorrect. 
In addition, the Plaintiffs were, at all times, represented by 
a real estate agent. The agent had the multiple listing service 
book with him, which contained the exact dimensions of the lot. 
The real estate agent was aware that, if the exact dimensions of 
the lot were important to the Plaintiffs, a survey could have been 
required. The real estate agent knew that the Earnest Money Form, 
Exhibit P-28, contains a place where a survey can be required. 
There was no misrepresentation as to the size of the property 
which Plaintiffs purchased. There was a discussion about where the 
backyard ended; which discussion centered around the fact that 
neither party knew where the boundary was. Nowhere in the 
testimony does one find any statement which amounts to a 
representation by the Defendants that the backyard of the home 
extended some 98 feet from the foundation. 
The record is clearly insufficient to support Findings 24 and 
25, (R. 696) made by the Trial Court or to support the conclusion 
that such Findings amounted to a misrepresentation. It is 
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respectfully suggested that because this matter was tried over a 
period of several days, spanning a couple of months, the Trial 
Court simply did not have a clear recollection of the exact 
testimony which had been given by the parties. The Trial Court's 
error should be reversed by this Court. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS• RELIANCE UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS 
REGARDING LOT SIZE WAS REASONABLE. 
The concept of negligent misrepresentation was first 
enunciated by this Court in Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 
Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967)- In that case, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Where one having a pecuniary interest in a transaction, 
is in a superior position to know material facts, and 
carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
concerning them, expecting the other party to rely and 
act thereon, and the other party reasonably does so and 
suffers loss in that transaction, the representor can be 
held responsible if the other elements of fraud are also 
present. Id. at 662. 
See, also, Christenson v. Com. Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302 
(Utah, 1983). 
However, the law on negligent misrepresentation does not leave 
the supposed victim of the representation without duty to inquire. 
As was stated by the Supreme Court in Jardine: 
In regard to this alleged cause of action for negligent 
misrepresentation, it is pertinent to keep in mind that 
there is recognized a defense somewhat analogous to 
contributory negligence in other tort actions. The one 
who complains of being injured by such a false 
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever 
is told to him but has the duty of exercising such degree 
of care to protect his own interests as would be 
exercised bv an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person 
under the circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is 
17 
precluded from holding someone else to account for the 
consequences of his own neglect. Id. at 662- (Emphasis 
added.) 
This concept has remained unchanged in the case law since 
Jardine. At first blush, the decision in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
1239 (Utah, 1980), would appear to relieve the supposed victim of 
a negligent misrepresentation from the obligation to protect 
himself. However, even in Dugan, the Supreme Court noted the 
responsibility of the vendee of real property as follows: 
Furthermore, a vendee of real property, in the absence of 
facts putting him on notice, has no duty to investigate 
to determine what the vendor has misrepresented the area 
conveyed. Id. at 1247. (Emphasis added.) 
Simply put, the Court in Dugan was stating the obvious, i.e., that 
the facts of that particular case did not place upon that vendee 
the responsibility to investigate further. 
The differences between the Dugan case and the case at hand 
are striking. In Dugan, a specific representation was made as to 
an exact amount of property. The representation made, which was 
undisputed in Dugan, was that there were 22 3/4 acres of property. 
No such similar representation was made by the Defendants herein. 
In addition, in Dugan, it was admitted that the parties did not 
fully inspect the property and that they could not see all of the 
property from where they were standing. 
In the case at hand, no specific representation as to the size 
of the lot was ever made other than the true statement in the fact 
sheet that the dimensions were "98 • x 102l,f. Instead, there were 
only vague references to an inexact boundary line, the location of 
which both parties agreed they did not know. At the time this 
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discussion occurred, the parties were looking at the entire parcel. 
Finally, it was readily apparent, both to Forsbergs and to 
Kimballs, that a backyard which excluded 98 feet beyond the house 
was not physically possible. 
That the law with respect to the duty of a party to inquire 
has not changed is evident from the subsequent decision of the Utah 
Supreme Court in Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P. 2d 124 
(Utah, 1982). This decision was handed down after Duaan decision. 
In Mikkelson, the vendee of real property claimed negligent 
misrepresentation. The Supreme Court, in striking down such a 
claim, stated: 
While plaintiff may have initially received false 
information, he cannot reasonably continue to rely on it 
once true and corrected information is furnished him . . 
.. Id. at 126. 
The Supreme Court in Mikkelson then went on to cite the relevant 
language from the Jardine decision regarding the duty of a victim 
of misrepresentation to inquire. 
Other decisions have given some assistance in determining 
under what circumstances a party has a duty to reasonably inquire. 
For example, in Haaar v. Moblev, 638 P.2d 127 (Wyo. , 1981), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court stated: 
. . . that this Court was merely saying that when a party 
has been made aware of some inconsistencies between the 
facts and the representations of the parties, some 
investigation is called for and required. Here, the 
Mobleys had no inkling that the Hagars1 statements were 
false; and accordingly had no duty to investigate 
further. Id. at 133. (Emphasis added.) 
In the case at hand, the testimony of the Plaintiffs 
themselves shows the numerous "inconsistencies" which imposed upon 
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them a duty to reasonably inquire as to the exact boundaries of the 
property. From the outset, Farrell Forsberg testified that the 
size of the yard was a "very critical feature". (R. 1709.) When 
asked to tell what was said by Mr. Kimball regarding the size of 
the lot, Mr. Forsberg stated: 
The exact wording at this time I can't recall, but I do 
remember a very critical issue was the size of the 
backyard. (R. 1714.) 
Mr. Forsberg further admitted that he was told that the poplar 
trees were "roughly the back west boundary of the yard". (R. 
1718.) 
Most importantly, Mr. Forsberg agreed with Mr. Kimball that 
the real message given at the time the parties inspected the 
property was that no one knew where the boundary lines of the 
property were and that, other than a general discussion regarding 
the backyard, no specific representations were made. Mr. Forsberg 
testified as follows: 
He [Kimball] did not know what the exact property line 
was. 
« . . 
Question: And therefore, based upon the fact that you 
knew Mr. Kimball didn't exactly know either, 
did you ask for a survey of the property? 
Answer: We did not. (R. 1807-08.) 
In substance and in fact, Mr. Forsberg merely made an 
assumption, based upon his own observation, without reliance upon 
the statements of Mr. Kimball or the fact sheet. In response to 
that specific question, Mr. Forsberg stated: 
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Question: Therefore, you would have to agree with me, 
wouldn't you, that you assumed that the 
backyard of this home went somewhere near 98 
feet; correct? 
Answer: I must have made that assumption- That was 
not specifically addressed with the Kimballs. 
(R. 1810-) 
The Plaintiffs were literally surrounded by vagueness and 
inconsistencies which demanded that they make further inquiry into 
this so-called "critical" issue. The Trial Court could come to no 
other conclusion than that a reasonably prudent person would have 
a duty to further inquire. Such inquiry would have been simple for 
Plaintiffs to accomplish. 
The decision in Jardine holds that the applicable burden of 
proof in negligent misrepresentation cases is clear and convincing. 
The specific testimony of the parties has been set out .in toto in 
this Brief. Clearly, such burden has not been met, given the total 
circumstances, and giving every benefit of every doubt to the 
Plaintiffs. The Trial Court's error in holding that there was 
justifiable and reasonable reliance should be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE RECORD DOES NOT JUSTIFY AN AWARD 
OP DAMAGES IN THE SUM OP $21,769.90. 
It is axiomatic in the law that any award of damages must be 
supportable by the evidence presented at trial. It is also 
apparent in the case at hand that the Trial Court had no record or 
evidence upon which to base a calculation of damages resulting in 
a judgment of $21,767.90. The Trial Court adopted the argument of 
the Plaintiffs that they were to have received 9,996 square feet of 
property but that they received only 4,628 square feet of property. 
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(Finding of Fact No. 27, R. 696.) There is no support for this 
Finding for the following reasons: 
1. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court contain no 
finding that the backyard of the resident was represented to be 98" 
x 102 • . The Trial Court failed to make such a finding or to state 
the basis upon which such a finding was founded. The testimony of 
the Plaintiff was that he did not rely upon the measurements of 98' 
x 102' as set out in the fact sheet. (Exhibit P-27.) In Mr. 
Forsberg's own words: 
It's exact measurements I don't recall focusing on. I 
was left with the impression that it was a sizable back 
yard. Those numbers seem to me a sizable yard. (R. 
1790.) 
In another place, Mr. Forsberg admitted that he simply assumed that 
the yard was "spacious" without confirming any specific 
measurements. (R. 1791.) Accordingly, there is no fact upon which 
the Trial Court could make a determination that the backyard of the 
home should have measured 98' x 102'. It then follows that a 
calculation of a judgment amount based upon such a finding also 
must fail. 
2. The Findings of the Trial Court contain no 
determination that the fact sheet (Exhibit P-27) was, in and of 
itself, misleading or ambiguous. The fact sheet simply says: 
"Yard Size: 98' x 102', flat backyard with room for a pool". As 
has been shown by Exhibit P-2, the actual dimensions of the lot 
which was purchased by the Plaintiffs measures 98 feet on one side 
and 102 feet on the other, yielding a total square footage in the 
lot of 9,885 square feet. This square footage was not a matter of 
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testimony but is determined by a simple mathematical calculation 
from the dimensions found in the record. Therefore, if the Trial 
Court's finding was that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 9,996 
square feet of real estate, the facts show that they received 
nearly that amount. If anything, the Plaintiffs would be entitled 
to a judgment of the difference between 9,996 square feet and the 
actual square footage of the lot, which difference is 111 square 
feet. 
3. The Trial Court's findings contain no mention that 
the representation in Exhibit P-27 "room for a pool" was false or 
that such falsity resulted in damages to the Plaintiffs. In other 
words, if the Plaintiffs felt that there had been a 
misrepresentation that the lot contained adequate room for a pool, 
the record is silent as to whether or not that is or is not true. 
No evidence was presented by the Plaintiffs to show that a pool 
could not have been constructed within the boundaries of the lot as 
purchased by the Plaintiffs. In addition, no effort is made by the 
Trial Court to state that because there was no room for a pool the 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in the sum of $21,7 69.90. 
4. The finding that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 
9,996 square feet of property is unsupported by the testimony of 
the Plaintiffs themselves. The Plaintiffs admitted that, if 
anything, the representation made to them regarding the boundary 
line of the lot was within "a couple of feet" of the trees. (R. 
178.) On cross examination, Mr. Forsberg admitted that the 
furthest distance between the home and the trees was 4 5 feet. This 
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distance was placed by the Plaintiff on Exhibit P-3 5, as shown on 
Appendix 2 attached hereto. Therefore, if the Plaintiffs were 
entitled to anything, it was to the difference between the actual 
property boundary and the line of trees. The Plaintiffs should not 
be granted a greater remedy than that which their own 
representation allows. 
Unfortunately, there was no testimony given by the Plaintiffs 
as to what the distance between the actual boundary line and the 
line of trees was. It clearly was not 45 feet. It clearly was not 
98 feet. Most importantly, it clearly could not stand as the basis 
for entering a judgment of $21,769.90. 
5. The Finding regarding 9,996 square feet is further 
defeated by the Plaintiffs1 own words. Mr. Forsberg said that his 
concern was that the backyard be "spacious". He then admitted that 
to him forty feet of backyard was "spacious". On Exhibit P-35, he 
then admits that the distance to the farthest tree was forty-five 
feet. By his own definition, the backyard to the trees met his 
needs and expectations. Yet, the Trial Court granted judgment for 
an additional forty-five feet of lost property. 
The judgment of the Trial Court exceeded the testimony of the 
Plaintiffs and the evidence presented at trial. At the very best, 
assuming that a misrepresentation occurred and assuming that there 
was justifiable reliance, the Plaintiffs were entitled to the 
difference between the actual boundary of the property and forty-
five feet. The Plaintiffs had the burden to give the Trial Court 
a calculation as to that amount of property. Instead, the Trial 
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Court granted to the Plaintiffs a judgment of the difference 
between the actual boundary of the property and 98 feet. There is 
no support for this calculation or judgment in the record. The 
Trial Court must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that these Appellants have met 
their duty and burden on appeal to marshall all of the evidence in 
favor of the conclusions of the Trial Court and to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of that evidence. This matter was tried to the Trial 
Court over a period of several weeks, with long delays in between 
trial days. Testimony was presented on June 23, June 24 and part 
of June 25. The matter was not taken up again until July 14, 15 
and 16. An additional day of trial was held on July 21. The 
Decision of the Trial Court was issued on July 31. At the time of 
his Decision, the Trial Judge did not have, at his disposal, any 
accurate transcription of the testimony which had been given over 
a month previously. Surely, the Trial Judge could not have been 
expected to have accurately recalled the testimony on the issue of 
lot size and the supposed misrepresentations. As has been shown, 
the evidence did not measure up to the requisite specificity upon 
which the Trial Court could make its Findings on this issue. 
Unlike other cases, this is not a matter where the credibility 
of the witnesses was in question. Because the witnesses 
essentially agreed on the major points, the Trial Court did not 
need to make a determination as to who was telling the truth and 
who was not. The undisputed evidence was simply not enough to 
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support a finding and conclusion as to negligent misrepresentation. 
The Trial Court's Findings should be reversed and the matter 
remanded with instructions to dismiss the misrepresentation claim. 
DATED this 23rd day of December, 1593 
DOANE R. SMITJT 
Attorney for Appellants 
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PANORAMIC VIEWS from almost every room in this new home in .Benchmark. 
Be the first owner of these gorgeous hardwood floors, customised kitchen 
with adjoining family room, and all that is included in this exciting 
three-level contemporary design. Vaulted ceilings, light, bright and 
spacious as designed by architect David Rohovit. Some of the details include: 
Price: 
Construction: 
Reduced to $260,000.00 
Brick and stucco with charming lattice-work 
trim. 
Style: 
Entry Level: 
Second Level: 
Third Level: 
Square Footage: 
Yard Size: 
Garage: 
Schools: 
Customized three-level contemporary. 
Gorgeous entry dnto living room with fireplace, 
formal dining, kitchen/family room, office or 
library with fabulous three-quarter bath. 
Master suite and bath with Jacuzzi tub, separate 
show:, and double sinks. Two additional bed-
rooms and full bath, largo laundry room with 
sink, and cozy family room with fireplace. Room 
under garage could be a terrific exercise area. 
An additional 1,072 square feet of unfinished 
space allowing for family expansion or game 
rooms, storage, etc. Walk-out to level back 
yard area. 
Main: 1,590 1st Level: 1,500 2nd Level: 1,072 
3,090 Finished Square Feet 
95f x 102', fiat back yard with room for a pooi. 
Two-car and parking pad. 
Beacon Heights Elementary 
Hillside Junior High 
Highland High 
Imagine having dinner cr. this beautiful deck overlooking the valley! The 
quality of this heme speaks for itself. 
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